Politically speaking, every move that took place in Armenia since September 1 (and some even before) of this passing year is viewed through the prism of the Armenia-Turkey foreign policy protocols.

The passing year was marked by the Turkish-Armenian dialogue, everything else, even the Karabakh issue, was perceived in that highlight.

The process started yet in January, when Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan stated Armenia’s interest in Turkey’s participation in the construction of a new power block at Metsamor power plant.

That speech became the first shock of 2009 and predetermined the main emotional background of the year: the Armenian-Turkish relations. Many protested then “in order to prevent Turkey from gaining access to Armenia’s nuclear secrets”.

However, further developments proved everything was yet ahead.

In April, prior to the 94th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in Ottoman Turkey, news came from Switzerland that Yerevan and Ankara had signed a so called “Roadmap”.

All the top news immediately lost importance and the Armenian from Yerevan to the farthest Diaspora nation started making futile efforts at understanding the point.

Practically the whole administrative-bureaucratic apparatus, that is, representatives of all three political parties of the ruling coalition – the Republican Party of Armenia, Prosperous Armenia (Bargavatch Hayastan) and the Country of Law (Orinats Yerkir) – suddenly turned into active supporters of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations.

The majority of the Armenian business community, too, spoke for the roadmap. Their standpoint had obvious reasons: the unblocked border would have a very positive effect on the cost and speed of cargo transportation, making the idea very appealing.

The signing of the roadmap was sharply criticized by the Armenian Revolutionary party (ARF) Dashnaktsutyun. ARF made a statement saying that the 16 year Turkish blockade was and remains to be another way of leading a war, and signing protocols with an enemy is inadmissible when the other side continues the war, supports Azerbaijan and does not admit the 1915 Genocide.

While society tried to understand the content of the roadmap, authorities of Armenia and Turkey managed to ink two protocols on establishing bilateral diplomatic relations.

The protocols, as opposed to the roadmap, were publicized, and many questions received answers – Yerevan would officially renounce its right for any territorial claims and oblige to recognize the existing international borders, while Turkey would unblock Armenia’s communications.

Once the protocols were publicized, Dashnaks, again, protested, leading more than ten political organizations joined them in campaigns that reached the streets of Los Angeles and Paris and the internet’s world wide community. The protocol debate caused a split in the National Academy of Sciences; the Institute of History was against the policy undertaken by the authorities, whereas the Institute of Eastern Studies was for it.

The ruling coalition parties and the business community formed a single “support structure” and repeated after the foreign minister and the president of Armenia that: “the protocols do not contain preconditions, the Karabakh conflict is a separate issue, and Genocide happened.”

In June, months before the protocol anger reached its boiling point, 120 delegates from 20 countries took part in the pan-Armenian conference held in Stepanakert (Nagorno Karabakh) upon the initiative of the ARF Dashnaktsutyun’s Central Council of Hay Dat (the Armenian Cause).

A demand to dismiss RA Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandyan was submitted to the authorities and some rumbled that impeachment of the president should be considered.

In October, as a countermeasure, President Sargsyan took up a seven-day trip to four countries with large and active Armenian communities: Russia, USA, France and Lebanon.

The visit did not proceed smoothly, acts of protest were held at most of the places on his trip. In Paris, for example, the president was not allowed to visit the monument to honored Armenian composer Komitas; in Glendale about 10,000 representatives of the Armenian community of Los Angeles held a rally as a sign of protest against the Armenian-Turkish protocols.

However, on October 10 in Zurich, the protocols were signed.

In response Dashnaks held open parliamentary hearings which turned into a squabble between the ruling coalition party members and their opponents.

Later, a rally was held during which member of ARF Supreme Body Vahan Hovhannisyan stated: “Not only the president and the government have to be changed in our country, but also the whole governance system”.

As strange as it may sound, Armenia’s internal tensions were lessened due to Turkey, when it became clear that the protocol process would be sidetracked because of Turkey’s insistence on including Karabakh as part of the discussion.

During several months Ankara repeatedly stated that no diplomatic relations were possible between Armenia and Turkey without first settling the Karabakh issue. After Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s December visit to Washington, when despite all efforts US President Barack Obama failed to convince the Turkish Prime Minister, it became absolutely clear that Turkey would not put aside the ‘Karabakh issue’ for the sake of normalization of relations with Armenia.

Literally the next day, the Armenian President, in his turn, made it clear that Armenia can reconsider the signed protocols, and Prime Minister Sargsyan stressed that Yerevan feels entitled not only to not ratify the protocols, but also to withdraw from the negotiation process completely.

This time premier Sargsyan said nothing about the power plant.