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When assessing American expectations of Armenia’s possible role in the event of a conflict with Iran, an important distinction must be considered. In practical terms, the US is already in conflict with Iran. The question of American expectations of Armenian policy, therefore, consists of two separate issues:

First: Armenian policies regarding Iran currently, in recognition of the current conflict between Washington and Tehran, and

Second: Possible Armenian policies in the event of an actual military confrontation.

The current US conflict with Iran is rooted in three specific factors. First, the conflict is, in many ways, a culmination of simmering confrontation that is grounded in the 1979 takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran. The decades-long animosity between the US and Iran should not be underestimated, as it has only led entrenched, hard-line policies on both sides. The relationship between both the US and Iran has remained without resolution and without repair for decades. In addition, Iranian policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s, ranging from support for international terrorism, to its creation of a proxy paramilitary force in Lebanon, have both driven and determined US foreign policy in the Middle East.

The second aspect of the US conflict with Iran stems from a general strategic concern over the danger of Iranian ambition for weapons of mass destruction in general, and from a narrower fear of potential connections between such weapons and international Islamist terrorists, such as al Qaeda. The point here is not necessarily the likelihood or even the feasibility of these concerns, but rather the fact that it is this US perception that is shaping US national security.

And the third, and most recent, factor constituting the conflict between the US and Iran is the nature of the Iranian regime. Although Iran has been consistently portrayed by the US as an extremist or even rogue regime, there was a quiet but steady policy of engagement throughout the Clinton Administrations. This engagement reached its peak under the stewardship of then US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and, despite sporadic obstacles and misunderstandings, led to genuine hopes for a breakthrough. Working through the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations, this effort focused on forging a dialogue with two former Iranian presidents, Mohammad Khatami, through much of his two terms in office (1997-2001 and 2001-2005), and his predecessor, Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, although for a much shorter period.

But the 2005 election of Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad represented an abrupt end to the hopes of even the most optimistic Americans. The nature of the Iranian regime was marked by a return to the extreme rhetoric and aggressive world view of the revolutionary Iran of 1979. Externally, this fostered an end to dialogue with Washington, while internally it spurred a reassertion of Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Within this context of current conflict, the US holds minimal expectations from Armenia. Based on a recognition that the blockade and regional isolation of Armenia necessitates stable and positive relations with Iran, the US merely insists on Armenian conformity to limits to its ties with Iran. These limits are mainly centered on prohibitions on any potentially significant military ties and, despite the natural gas pipeline project, on any cooperative relationship in the nuclear field.

But US expectations of Armenian policy in the future will change.

As the course of this US-Iranian conflict continues, Armenia will be expected to abide by future US moves aimed at containing Iran. In the case of new efforts to contain and pressure Iran, for example, Armenia may very well be required to join a possible multilateral, Western-defined but US-driven, sanctions regime. And in such a case, with the United Nations seemingly as the most likely vehicle for sanctions, Armenia would be hard pressed to resist such Western (and US) pressure.

In the event of actual military conflict, however, the outlook for Armenia is altered somewhat. Ironically, current US strategic planning for possible military action against Iran recognizes Armenia as a possible “bridge” to Iran. Due to the over-riding strategic utility of Azerbaijan in a military context, Armenia is viewed from a carefully nuanced perspective.

Specifically, from a strategic perspective, US planners accept and afford a unique role for Armenia in the case of military action for two reasons:

First, a unique Armenian role as both a possible interlocutor in the initial stage and as a bridge to Iran in a post-conflict period, are welcomed as helpful options to US interests.

Second, given the delicacy of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, the enhanced role and value of Azerbaijan in such a military scenario thereby necessitates granting Armenia a special role. This is viewed as not only serving US interests in particular, but also in stabilizing the region as a whole.

Thus, while it is important to note the complexity of Armenia’s position, both geographically and diplomatically, it also seems clear that Armenia will remain hostage to developments in Iran. In addition to a potentially significant Armenian role, the exclusion of any direct Turkish role in US planning for Iran also represents a shift in the geopolitical parameters that have come to define the region for too long.

The Russia question

In many ways, the Russia position on Iran reflects its deeper foreign policy of seeking to reassert and regain a degree of its power and influence. This need to demonstrate and reaffirm its geopolitical relevance is an essential drive for much of Russian policies. And in this way, Russia prefers the current situation in Iran, from which it garners a degree of influence and, in the medium term, allows it to play a “spoiler” role in possibly thwarting or at least complicating US policy interests.

The Iran issue further grants Russia a degree of power that it can extend and project into the broader Middle East and Arab/Islamic world. But most rewarding, it can also exploit the Iran conflict as a wedge to widen the gap between the US and the European Union.

Thus, these broader strategic issues have far outpaced any real consideration by Moscow of its relationship with Yerevan. There is no danger of “compromise” in Armenian-Russian relations from the Iran issue. Armenia is simply too marginal for Russian considerations in this arena and the Iran issue is both too tenuous and the Armenian position too weak for Russian concerns.

It was, after all, Moscow who effectively aborted any Armenian hopes to leverage its gas pipeline to Iran to become a transit state. Russia not only has consolidated its control over the Armenian (and Georgian) energy sector, but easily manipulated the Armenia-Iran pipeline deal by reducing the actual diameter of the pipeline, limiting the flow of energy to only meeting Armenian domestic needs and, thereby, preventing any re-export of gas beyond Armenia’s borders. This was yet another demonstration of the inflated and outdated perception of Russia as a strategic ally, and a confirmation of the danger of Armenia becoming little more than a Russian garrison state.

Georgian involvement . . .

Despite the fact that Georgia is still the “center of gravity” for the US military in the South Caucasus, it is of marginal use for any operation directed against Iran. In terms of planning for the Iranian theater, Georgian airspace is not much of a consideration beyond basic over-flight rights and its ports, although strategic, offer only a limited de-embarkation option compared to the utility of other alternatives, such as Kuwait and Qatar. And finally, it is clearly Azerbaijan, and neither Georgia nor Armenia, that is the most important regional actor, mainly due to the fact that the only real route for a land invasion of Iran is from the northern border with Azerbaijan along the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan also offers the promise of proximity, with air base options and even a naval option for US military planners.

. . . and the greater neighborhood

It can be argued that, in the short term, Iranian-American tension has little or no impact on the situation in the South Caucasus, mainly because the tension is neither new nor particularly threatening. As demonstrated above, it is the next stage of this tension that holds significant implications for both security and stability in the South Caucasus.

The sole exception, however, is the fact that the current situation in Iran does effect the region, but not from tension or conflict with the US. Rather, the most pressing impact on the region is the Iranian pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Or to be more specific, it is the development of a three-track weapons course: nuclear, chemical and missile capabilities.

Conclusion

In addition, it is instructive to examine Armenia from an Iranian perspective. Most fundamentally, Iran’s view of Armenia is driven by a shared sense of isolation and sees Armenia as a neighbor under siege, with a shared isolation and a common need to overcome external pressure. A second element of this Iranian view of Armenia is one of opportunity, as Armenia is seen as a neighbor seeking cooperation over confrontation. In practical terms, this is seen in Armenia as a routine destination for Iranians on weekend visits and by more than 1,200 Iranian students currently studying in Armenian universities and educational institutions.

Iran also exhibits a broader geopolitical consideration, as Iran’s engagement with Armenia is seen as a tactical counterweight to the projection of Western, or U.S. power and influence.

Through much of the period of independent states in the Caucasus, Iran had sought to counter Turkey, as the U.S. regional proxy or agent state. More recently, however, given the deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations and the replacement of proxy states by direct U.S. engagement, Iranian strategy has shifted to counter the U.S. more directly. The expansion of the U.S. military presence has surrounded Iran in each direction: from Iraq to the west, Azerbaijan to the north, Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan to the east and northeast, and in the Gulf to the south. Thus, Iran feels compelled to urgently pursue external ties, to Russia, with Armenia and by improving relations with Azerbaijan.

Thus, from the Iranian perspective, the significance of Armenia stems from three considerations:

   1. Strategic, by a shared sense of blockade and isolation,
   2. Geographic, with Armenia as a neighbor seeking cooperation over confrontation, and
   3. Geopolitical, as Armenia offers an avenue to check the surrounding of Iran by a web of expanding US military bases.

And, finally, from the broadest perspective, Iran’s national interests in the region are driven by the pursuit of the only remaining outlet: through the North-South transport network, with the South Caucasus as an integral link in that plan. This too is rooted in the isolation of the Iranian regime. And I do believe that it is no longer a question of if there will be a new Iran. It is now a question of when there will be a new Iran.

(Richard Giragosian, a former Professional Staff Member of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, is a Washington-based analyst specializing in international relations and security in the former Soviet Union. He is a regular contributor to several international publications including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He is also a guest lecturer at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.)