As tragic and disturbing as were the violence and deaths from March 1, 2008 for Armenia, the implications from the day are much deeper and more profound.

Specifically, the implications on Armenia from March 1st are two-fold. First, March 1st revealed that the political reality in the country has changed, irrevocably. Second, it also exposed the government as much less popular and more distrusted than ever before.

Since last March, it is increasingly obvious that there is no way to return to the pre-election status quo. The political reality has moved on, making the parliamentary and all other political institutions less and less relevant, as they no longer reflect Armenia’s political landscape.

This changed political reality is also exacerbated by the fact that the Sargsyan government differs from all previous Armenian governments in two crucial aspects: a lack of legitimacy and a lack of popular support. These two major deficiencies combine to deny the government of any real mandate to lead. Such internal weakness further exposes that the authorities are much more willing to intimidate the population than to serve the people.

A “crisis of confidence”

One year after March 1st, it is also clear that President Sargsyan has inherited a dangerous legacy of distrust and discontent, culminating in a crisis of confidence that has eroded trust in the government and faces a further challenge in the form of public demands for change.

Ironically, for much of the last decade, the Armenian population had seemed to have grown accustomed to flawed elections, economic inequality and a lack of democratic governance. Over time, the population became increasingly disengaged from politics; a pronounced general state of apathy took hold in Armenia. From such widespread apathy, and the related onset of public mistrust, emerged the most significant obstacles to meaningful political change and economic development. The apathy was sustained by the promise of a more prosperous future. Most of the population realized, however, that the mirage is attainable for only the small, few and corrupt. In other words, the overwhelming tendency was to share from the corrupt system, not to change it. But with March 1st, there has been a vibrant reawakening.

A lingering political crisis

Three crucial new developments have contributed to a political crisis unprecedented in Armenia's recent history. In this way, the Armenian government’s most basic impediment stems from a distinctly new political context, insofar as the population has emerged from years of apathy to voice fresh and strident demands for change. This is, at least in part, rooted in the opaque nature of the Armenian political system, where dissent is seen as a direct threat to the state rather than as characteristic of a healthy democracy. Within such a closed political system, there is no mechanism for expressing political discontent, a lack that exacerbates underlying tensions. This means there can be no return to the pre-election status quo, as the Armenian people have expressed a new sense of civic empowerment.

Just as importantly, the impact of March 1st also centers on the reality that Armenian society has changed, whereby people are no longer content to witness yet another round of flawed and fixed elections. While frustration over the February 19, 2008 presidential election simmered, the real outrage erupted once the Armenian authorities decided to forcibly disperse the unarmed demonstrators who had gathered for several weeks in a peaceful and generally well-organized public protest.

But the roots of that anger and frustration were not only in the politics of selection over election or from being denied any choice or voice in politics. The eruption of public anger and outrage was equally tied to years of widening disparities in wealth and income, and a pronounced lack of economic opportunity, or even hope for the future. And unlike other countries, the division between the small wealthy oligarchic elite and the much larger, much poorer general population is all too obvious, seen every day, every where and in every way.

This economic undercurrent of discontent is only increasing, especially as the Armenian authorities are now facing the onset of the effects from the global financial and economic crisis. And although the record of economic reform in recent years has been fairly impressive, it is not enough to save the situation, as one of the more negative aspects of Armenia’s economic reality is the “paradox” of economic growth, whereby several years of double-digit economic growth have resulted in an uneven or partial sharing of wealth and higher living standards among the overall population. Moreover, widening disparities in wealth and income have only led to a serious socioeconomic divide.

There is also a geographic aspect of this socioeconomic divide, along urban-rural lines and marked by an over-concentration of economic activity and opportunity in urban centers and the capital. This division has fostered more pronounced regional and rural income inequalities and has been exacerbated by a wide variance in quality and access of essential public services such as health, education and other social services.

The infrastructural divide between regions and urban centers has also encouraged greater migration to urban capitals from the countries’ outlying rural areas. This geographic rural-urban divide is also reflected in the course of political development and democratization, as power is overwhelmingly concentrated in the capital.

Armenia’s political polarization

Over the past year, Armenia has also witnessed a widening polarization in politics, defined by a newly united political opposition and an increasingly unpopular government, and worsened by the socio-economic divide between a small wealthy ruling elite and a much larger population inhibited by limited economic opportunity and even less political power.

But the government’s traditional reliance on a record of statistical economic growth as a source for legitimacy, both externally and domestically, seems to be running short of utility. Crippled by a lack of popular support and hindered by a record of tainted elections, the Armenian authorities have used economic growth to obscure its lack of a mandate to govern. But the combination of structural fragility, entrenched corruption and incomplete reform is now posing a threat to the economic system itself, questioning whether it can sustain itself in the face of mounting challenges.

The Armenian government must now learn to govern -- not just rule -- the country. Yet it is disabled by its weakness and undermined by a lack of legitimacy and an absence of any real popular mandate. This not only calls into question the authority of the state, but also seriously erodes the government's capacity to implement the difficult policies needed to satisfy mounting demands for change and expectations for reform. Thus, as the political crisis remains far from resolved and is likely only to continue, there is still a very real chance for a potentially unprecedented period of change, possibly marking the last page of this chapter of Armenian politics.