Today few people remember the date of the last presidential election in Armenia. February 19 has been lost in the void of March 1.

Of course, everybody has his or her own way of remembering and analyzing what happened. From the very beginning conflicting opinions were expressed concerning the nature of the events, but today, when a whole year has passed, all these opinions sound equally fresh and emotional. Some people still think that it was a failed foreign attempt to make a “color revolution” in the country; some view the events as a domestic case (attempts of avenging circles to usurp power); some others view them against the background of the general dissatisfaction of the masses concerning the situation in the country.

One way or another, exactly a year ago the first president of Armenia was able to unite more than 350,000 people around him ( according to official voting data) and make an ultimatum demanding to conduct new presidential elections. It should be particularly pointed out that it was the first president, not the opposition, who was able to that. The domestic policy developments in Armenia have for a long time been personified, and this is what explains the phenomenon of the second political advent of both Karen Demirchyan (1998) and Levon Ter-Petrosyan (2008).

The attitude to Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan is also based on the personal factor: a purely “physiological rejection” of their personas is typical of the overwhelming majority of their most radical opponents.

Thus, talking about the current state of the opposition is the same as talking about the current state of Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Today it is much weaker than a year ago, and it can be explained by several reasons at once. First of all, during the past year the acting power has grown noticeably stronger, whereas a year ago it basically did not exist at all. The responsibly for making particular decisions was then shared by the exiting administration of Robert Kocharyan and the new one that was “taking the baton”. The shares were almost equal.

In February-March of last year there was something like “double-power” in the country, and this is exactly why during the two explosive rally weeks after the presidential election none of the presidents shouldered the final responsibility for taking decisive action. It was in this situation that the first president decided to take on these functions. Today, the “three parallel presidents” game is over, and the acting power is the only one.

Another reason for weakening Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s positions is the more solid structure of the power pyramid. By the time Robert Kocharyan left, the power pyramid he had created began to fall apart in front of one’s eyes, and many representatives of the state machine, quite unexpectedly, supported Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Among them there were both heads of administrations and diplomats, including ambassadors. Virtually each day in February 2008
testified to the destruction of Robert Kocharyan’s pyramid, moreover, among those who switched to the first president’s side were not only the representatives of large businesses, but also the members of the Republican Party of Armenia.

The third reason for the relative weakness of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s current positions is the comparative scarcity of material resources. At the beginning of last year his political activity was financially supported by the representatives of large businesses, who no longer own their production today. Within the past period the property of “oligarchs who turned their coats” was redistributed, the latest manifestation of which was the auction of the mineral water plant Bjni, whose owner was Khachatur Sukiasyan, who had supported Levon Ter-Petrosyan. The famous plant was bought by Ruben Hayrapetyan – the proxy of the acting president, a member of the Republican Party of Armenia and the Head of the Football Federation of Armenia.

The weakness of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s positions, which, by the way, was apparent last year as well, is the absence of politicians associated in the public consciousness with such notions as “decency,” “professionalism,” “devotion to the national and state interests” among his supporters.

In August of last year 16 opposition parties and social movements (Peoples’ Party of Armenia, “Republic,” “Liberty,” “Democratic Way,” The Liberal Party, The Social-Democratic Party “Gnchakyan”, The Conservative Party of Armenia, “The Alternative” movement, and others) signed a declaration creating the Armenian National Congress. However, it is obvious that the charisma and influence of one such politician as Vazgen Manukyan will outweigh in the public consciousness all the 16 leaders of the Armenian National Congress parties taken together. However, neither he nor other experienced oppositionists (Hrant Khachatryan, Paruyr Hayrikyan, and others) even consider the idea of joining the first president.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan has no outside support either. Of course, both Ankara and Baku would have liked to see him in the position of Armenia’s president, but even they will hardly provide him with material support, if need be. The first president has for a long time been perceived as “a burned card,” and nobody is going to make any bets. In the first place, he has already been a resigned head of the country, and in the second place, he was incapable of properly using the “double-power” that was created in February of last year, and instead, he led his electorate to an apparent slaughter.

However, the paradox of the situation is that it is just this state of things that can give strength to Ter-Petrosyan. The state of despair in which the radical opposition in his person has found itself, is capable of steering its actions along the most unpredictable direction, as there is nothing else to lose. Taking into account that the first president never burdened himself with extra care of those he was in charge of, one can expect anything from him. Especially now, on the threshold of the first anniversary of the tragic events.

The rally planned for March 1, in which, according to analysts, no less than 20,000 people may take part, is capable of clarifying a lot in this respect. The participants of the rally will be given instructions, which will allow avoiding possible provocations from the representatives of power. It has been announced already that a march has been planned after the rally. As it has already been stated by the Armenian National Congress, the rally and the following march should “facilitate the creation of a healthier political system in the country.” During these days one will be able to witness and compare the current state of the radical opposition with last year’s state. Sadly, judging by the external manifestations, no significant lessons have been learned since a year ago.