The prospect of former OSCE Minsk Group mediator on the Karabakh issue settlement Matthew Bryza’s possible appointment as the US Ambassador to Azerbaijan has become one of the most discussed subjects in Armenia.

The main issue in this connection is: how can Ambassador Bryza impact the negotiation process considering his close relations with Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s political circles and his kindred relations with a famous Turkish family?

The recent hearings at the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs during which Bryza, as the nominee for US Ambassador in Azerbaijan, was asked impartial questions related to his partial position on the Karabakh issue settlement, have made this issue more urgent.

The decision by the UN International Court of Justice, The Hague, announced on July22, according to which Kosovo’s proclamation of independence does not contradict international law, became the news of the day in Armenia where such a decision is believed to nullify Azerbaijan’s claims that the Armenian nation cannot gain independence twice and have two states.

Despite the statements quite frequently voiced by the Azeri authorities on the possibility of resuming hostilities against Armenia, it is yet extremely premature to speak about prospects of a new war. There are no objective prerequisites in current circumstances that would indicate launch of war in the near future.

Azerbaijan is building its statehood on oil, and oil tariffs nowadays reflect quite positively on main economic indicators. In that view it is highly unlikely that Azerbaijan would go for a cardinal change of situation, especially with most indefinite outcome prospects.

Twenty-one years ago this week the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Senate passed a Resolution on “US assistance to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh issue in accordance with the people’s will of Soviet Armenia”.

The document was calling on Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to “discuss the demand for reunification with Armenia with representatives of Nagorno Karabakh as well as representatives of the democratic movement (including members of Karabakh Committee recently released from confinement)”.

United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Yerevan has, no doubt, been an extraordinary event, if only for the rarity of such occasions. It has been 18 years since any US official of her rank came here.

Clinton’s visit was heralded by two strong statements: A G8 statement of the presidents of the USA, France and Russia said Armenia and Azerbaijan have to “take the next step and complete the work” on the main principles of the settlement of the protracted Karabakh conflict in order to begin drafting a peace agreement. The other statement came immediately after Clinton's visit, this time by OSCE Minsk group co-chairs and with a similar content.

A trilateral meeting between the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia is planned in St. Petersburg as part of a June 17-19 economic forum in the Russian city.

The main peculiarity of this meeting is, however, that it will be held in an atmosphere when under pressure from Azerbaijani leadership the Azeri society is laying claims to “Azerbaijani belonging” of the Armenian capital Yerevan.

In April year Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated in Estonian capital Tallinn:

Issues pertaining to domestic life have been taking the forefront in Armenia’s politics in the past six month reflecting a shift of political attention and public concerns from the huge foreign-policy debate on Armenia-Turkey and the Karabakh problem.

The change of public and political attitudes is conditioned by several factors, of which is also the de-facto suspension of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and its uncertain prospects in light of mounting tensions in relations between Turkey and Israel.

Tensions in Turkey-Israel relations accumulating over the past two years have recently reached their zenith.

Given the peculiarities of the regional power layout, an issue of interest rises on how it all might affect Armenia – be it in terms of Armenia-Israel relations or the prospects of the Armenian Genocide recognition in Israel.

Or in the USA, for that matter. Jewish organizations have been traditionally supporting the Turkish lobby in their resistance to Genocide recognition process in the US Congress.

Last week Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan submitted a loan application to the Eurasian Economic Community’s anti-crisis fund to finance construction of an Armenia-Iran railway. (EAEC is an economic organization with six post-Soviet member-countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It develops a joint foreign economic policy, as well as tariff and pricing policy).

The perspective of building such a railroad with Iran is of exceptional significance to Armenia, because it would link Armenia with ports of the Indian Ocean.

While the May 23 Parliamentary elections in Nagorno Karabakh have changed little inside the self-declared republic, the very vote itself has attracted attention in the scope of Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey relations.

Diplomatic clouds started darkening over Nagorno Karabakh yet prior to the elections, when the European Union took a harsh stand stating that it “does not recognize as legal the forthcoming May 23 elections in Karabakh”.